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The German History of Art has been particularly gen-
erous about speculating on the possibility of finding a 
good and permanent method of the analysis of works 
of  art.  In  particular,  Hans Sedlmayr  and Otto  Pächt 
wrote interesting essays in relation to identifying a rig-
orous method in art  history.  For instance,  Pächt,  in 
Methodisches zur Kunsthistorischen Praxis,  wonders 
how it would be possible for us to recognise the exact 
moment in which we could finally assert that we are 
observing  and understanding  an  object  in  the  right 
way (whatever  this  "right way"  may be)1.  Moreover, 
according to Pächt, the same large amount of philo-
sophical,  iconological  and theological  interpretations 
that art historians sometimes believe they see behind 
a work of art leads, on the contrary, to misinterpreta-
tions (Pächt takes as an example the many abstracted 
philosophical and theological theories extracted from 
the works of Hyronimus Bosch)2. In this case, Pächt 
considers  a  key  issue  of  art  history  and  aesthetic, 
namely if  an “objective way" could be found to ob-
serve and correctly interpret a work of art. This ques-
tion gives rise to many others: To what extent is the 
creation of theories and conjectures in the History of 
Art a result of our scrupulous analytical observation? 
And to what extent are our personal a priori ideas and 
idiosyncrasies actually responsible for the creation of 
a theory? Is there an objective reality and independ-
ence of the work of art which interacts somehow with 
the subjectivity  of  the  observer? Hans Sedlmayr,  in 
his  essay  Zu einer  strengen Kunstwissenschaft [To-
ward a rigorous study of Art], wrote:
“However it would be a mistake to conclude from 
all  of  this  that  aesthetic  products  are  entirely  
“subjective”  entities.  On  the  contrary:  just  as  
works  of  art  are  repeatedly  re-created  and  
formed anew by viewing subjects, each work of  
art  is itself,  in its totality,  an objective reality,  a  
separate object world that can be examined and 
accepted like any other concrete reality and that  
can be penetrated through contemplation or con-
ceptualization”.3
According to these words, the work of art has an ob-
jectivity independent of the observer, but represents 
at the same time a subjective entity being constantly 
re-created. In this respect, the creation of a historical-
artistic  theory  brings  to  mind  that  which  Stephen 
Toulmin called a "two-way affair"4, with regard to the 
observation of a scientific object in post-modern sci-
ence. The observer and the object being observed are 
personally involved in a kind of reciprocal influence, in 
which the scientist loses the aura of positivistic „neut-
ral spectator" and becomes part of an intellectual os-
mosis. More recently, Bruno Latour stressed how this 
kind of osmosis generates considerable confusion in 
this "modern era", since our society is no longer able 
to  categorise  and  circumscribe  all  the  "hybrids" 
caused by the observation of nature and the creation 
of new scientific, ethical and sociological issues5. This 
confusion is even greater if we think about the History 
of Art per se. Normally, art historians find themselves 
face to face with a huge number of paintings, sculp-
tures,  engravings, miniatures etc.  and are often un-
able to identify the origin or precise date of a piece. In 
this case, the art historian's work is similar to that of a 
scientist.  Indeed,  we can find in  both cases  an  at-
tempt to bring order through observation into an oth-
erwise disorganized universe of data, as Erwin Panof-
sky highlighted in his Meaning of Visual Arts:
“Thus, while science endeavors to transform the  
chaotic variety  of  natural  phenomena into what  
may be called a cosmos of nature, the humanities  
endeavor to transform the chaotic variety of hu-
man records into what may be called a cosmos  
of culture.  [...]  In both cases the process of  in-
vestigation seems to begin with observation. But  
both the observer of a natural phenomenon and 
the examiner of a record are not only confined to  
the limits of their range of vision and to the avail-
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able material; in directing their attention to certain  
objects they obey, knowingly or not, a principle  
of pre-selection dictated by a theory in the case  
of the scientist  and by a general historical con-
ception in the case of the humanist”.6
Moreover, we can find another similarity between Hu-
manities and Science. The methodological process of 
theory-formation is, in any case, a psychological pro-
cess  and  therefore  is  exposed  to  a  multiplicity  of 
factors which are often completely independent from 
mere  objective  observation.  Karl  Popper  expressed 
himself clearly against the possibility of the logical re-
construction  of  the  processes  which  underlie  the 
formation of a scientific theory7, and this is even more 
true  for  that  which  concerns  Humanities.  Nobody 
would be able to reproduce exactly the creative pro-
cess  of  a  scientific  theory.  Similarly,  no-one  would 
have  the  ability  to  reconstruct  the  procedures  that 
scholars, artists and historians adopt in order to cre-
ate or re-create a cultural epoch. For instance, what 
do we mean when we use the word "Mannerism?" To 
this day, we are still unable to reach a real agreement 
as to what constitutes the definition of "Mannerism". 
In this sense, the History of Art has not been able to 
give clear  stylistic  coordinates  of  what  is meant by 
this term, sometimes creating semantic hocus-pocus 
ad hoc as the linguistic short-circuit „stylish style"8, or 
even trying to invent macro-categories to include the 
various manifestations of Mannerism in Art, Literature 
and Poetry, as in the case of Arnold Hauser9. How-
ever,  a  substantial  difference  occurs  between  the 
methods of  humanistic  disciplines  and those of  the 
scientific. In the creative process of a theory, the sci-
entists must determine their goals collectively and en-
deavour  to  achieve  them,  providing  results  that 
should then be accepted by the scientific community. 
Although Paul Feyerabend has convincingly demon-
strated how the scientific method is often the result of 
misinterpretation, deceptions and recycling of theor-
ies previously considered incorrect10. Science seems, 
at least apparently, to possess a more rigorous struc-
ture and a better knowledge of its purposes in com-
parison to Humanities. It is questionable whether the 
“means justify the end” if a group of chemists, physi-
cists or lab technicians reach their pre-fixed goals, in 
order for the results to be accepted by the scientific 
community.  A new step in scientific  knowledge has 
been taken, as well as a contribution to scientific the-
ories. Even though the epistemological debate is al-
ways fervent, we can claim, with approximation, that 
in the sciences a theory is given credence only when 
empirically tested and approved by a large proportion 
of a community. 
In the humanistic disciplines, and primarily in the 
various branches of historical disciplines, the proced-
ures don't seem to be so straightforward, and neither 
the  results.  Actually,  we  can  say  that  the  world  of 
Geisteswissenschaften,  which  Wilhelm  Dilthey  first 
separated  from  Naturwissenschaften,  appears  frag-
mented and random. Historians study events, facts or 
items belonging to the past in an attempt to determ-
ine historical occurrences or, in the case of art histori-
ans, try to recreate the cultural and stylistic climate of 
a place and time through a work of art. But there is 
actually no reliable test to validate or invalidate a the-
ory  or  conjecture,  as  happens  in  sciences.  A  well-
known example in  Art History could be the famous 
sculpture of Laocoon and his sons (Abb. 1). 
During the entire course of the 18th Century and bey-
ond, this piece was regarded as the exemplification of 
the calmness and balance of Greek Art. This was due 
to the theories of Johann Joachim Winckelmann who 
saw in this Roman copy of a Hellenistic sculpture the 
ideal  of  "noble  simplicity  and quiet  grandeur"  (edle 
Einfallt  und  stille  Größe)11.  Winckelmann's  theories 
Abb. 1: Hagesandros, Polydoros and Athenodoros, Laocoon and his 
sons, 1st Century b. C., Marble, 208 x 163 x 112, Vatican Museums, 
Rome.
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and descriptions of sculptures shaped the aesthetic 
of a whole century but nowadays, since the antiquar-
ian infatuation with the Greek past is in reality con-
fined to archeology, we are generally prone to see in 
the Laocoon a typical example of intense and pathetic 
“Hellenistic  Baroque",  that  is,  quite  the  opposite  of 
what  Winckelmann (and together  with  him the  18th 
Century  scholars),  saw in  this  work.  This  is  an  in-
stance  of  an  art  object  assuming  two diametrically 
opposed  meanings  in  two  different  epochs,  simply 
because  research  methodologies  and  horizons  of 
aesthetic  expectations  have  changed  radically.  But 
can we claim beyond all doubt that the 18th Century 
interpretation of the Laocoon was completely wrong 
and, on the contrary, ours is the correct one? Actu-
ally, it can't be claimed. It would be impossible for in-
stance  to  speak  about  scientific  evidence  that  the 
movements of Laocoon and his sons recall the typical 
Baroque  pathos,  instead  of  Winckelmann's  "noble 
simplicity and quiet grandeur". Even if we try to ob-
serve the statue from all angles and endeavour to find 
convincing arguments to confirm our theses, we must 
deal  with  the  fact  that  for  someone else  the  same 
sculpture will have a totally different meaning and ap-
pearance.  This  complexity  of  finding  an  agreement 
and a common method in the Arts has been well ex-
plained in the book  An Introduction to Reasoning by 
Stephen Toulmin, Richard Rieke and Allan Janik:
“In the law, all sorts of rational considerations fi-
nally  come  together  in  courts,  the  only  place  
where  disputed  issues  can  be  definitively  de-
cided. In science, too, the soundness and signi-
ficance of novel arguments is finally decided in a  
collective debate,  carried on among those who  
have  a  professional  grasp  of  the  relevant  sci-
entific problems. But in the fine arts, there exists  
no single collective forum within which the “ra-
tional  adequacy”  of  new products  and proced-
ures – whether those of the working artist or the  
critic, the historian or the theorist – must finally  
be weighed”.12
This reasoning has been taken somewhat too far. The 
tradition of History of Art studies in itself establishes 
somehow the coordinates of a, though variable, „ra-
tional  adequacy"  within  the discipline,  which should 
be followed by art historians and critics when study-
ing an artistic period or art object. Often it is far more 
difficult to go "off the rails", writing something really 
"revolutionary" and challenging a well established tra-
dition of studies. For example, very few art historians 
would dare to undermine a secular tradition of icono-
logical or stylistic studies behind artists like Michelan-
gelo or Leonardo da Vinci. Nevertheless, this doesn't 
deter more daring scholars from giving personal inter-
pretations which sometimes become an integrant part 
of Art History. This is, for instance, the case of Mona 
Lisa's description as a femme fatale by Walter Pater 
in his studies on the Renaissance. Since the days of 
Aestheticism are gone, today it would be difficult to 
have the same perception of Leonardo's masterpiece. 
This is actually  possible thanks to the beautiful  de-
scriptions of Pater, through which we can glimpse a 
ratio into his interpretation, enabling us to understand 
why the Mona Lisa could also be observed as a vam-
pire:
“Set it for a moment beside one of those white  
Greek  goddesses  or  beautiful  women  of  an-
tiquity, and how would they be troubled by this  
beauty, into which the soul with all its maladies  
has passed!  All  the thoughts and experience of  
the world have etched and moulded there, in that  
which they have of power to refine and make ex-
pressive  the  outward  form,  the  animalism  of  
Greece,  the lust of Rome, the mysticism of the  
middle age with its spiritual ambition and imagin-
ative  loves,  the  return  of  the  Pagan world,  the  
sins of the Borgias. She is older than the rocks  
among which she sits; like the vampire, she has  
been dead many times, and learned the secrets  
of the grave; and has been a diver in deep seas,  
and keeps  their  fallen  day  about  her;  and traf-
ficked for strange webs with Eastern merchants;  
and, as Leda, was the mother of Helen of Troy,  
and, as Saint Anne, the mother of Mary; and all  
this has been to her but as the sound of lyres and  
flutes, and lives only in the delicacy with which it  
has  moulded  the  changing  lineaments,  and 
tinged the eyelids and the hands”.13
We can see here another  methodological  aspect  of 
the History of Art in its purest form, and generally of 
historical  discipline,  that should be emphasized:  the 
narrative aspect. The History of Art is often written by 
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scholars not directly involved in the creative process 
of a work of art. The admirably concise and sarcastic 
quote generally attributed to Picasso („When art crit-
ics get together, they talk about forms, structures and 
meanings. When artists get together, they talk about 
where you can buy cheap turpentine”)  stresses how 
the  world  of  "speaking  of  arts"  seems  unavoidably 
separated from the world of "creating art". To quote 
an  Italian  intellectual  from the  first  half  of  the  20th 
Century, Renato Serra, the historical account of a fact 
differs from the fact itself. That is what Serra calls with 
the  Latin  expression  „opus  superadditum  operi”,  a 
work added above and beyond another work14. This 
discrepancy between the existence hic et nunc of an 
indisputable fact and its survival in history in the form 
of a mere account causes many difficulties in finding 
an effective method of study in the historical discip-
line.  Concerning the History of  Art,  on one side we 
have a concrete  work of  art  in  its  material  consist-
ence, and on the other side we have a sort of “parallel 
existence”  of  the same work through the ideas,  re-
search and essays of art historians translated in the 
form of a text. Hans Belting, in The End of the History 
of Art [Das Ende der Kunstgeschichte], has remarked 
how the process of writing about Arts represents an 
„analogy of  mimesis”,  since the work of art  is sup-
posed  „to  reproduce  either  something  which  was 
considered real, such as nature, or a truth,  such as 
beauty”. The critic or art historian is supposed after all 
„to reproduce the work by describing its relation to 
the content or model it reproduced, [...] transferring its 
visual  statement to the verbal  system of the text”15. 
This writing about art and artists, according to Belting, 
was sometimes interpreted as a challenge for the crit-
ics to imitate the artists and consequently re-create a 
work of art with words, which is not a viable solution 
to the discrepancy:
“But  the  imitation  of  the  artist  is  far  from  a  
simple solution and may not even be desirable.  
In our discipline, moreover, it is frustrated by the  
inconsistency  between  verbal  language  and 
visual imagery, at least in those instances where  
this distinction (which is being undermined by 
the integration of verbal signs into art) still holds  
true. Art history has not even reached a stage  
where such a mimesis (the critic or historian as  
artist) could be an issue”.16
At this point, it is questionable whether a connection 
between works of art and Art History could be really 
found, as well  as between artists and art historians. 
Moreover, would it be possible to speak about a valid 
art-historical  hermeneutic  method,  which  is  always 
adaptable and applicable? It is neither really easy to 
answer these questions,  nor  is  it  possible  to  find a 
practical solution to them. Nevertheless, in our opin-
ion, a unique contribution to the History of Art could 
come from a too-often neglected discipline, that is the 
History of Ideas. 
In the beautiful and memorable introduction to The 
Great Chain of Being, Arthur Lovejoy explains his con-
ception of the History of Ideas. From Lovejoy's words 
comes  an  adaptable  discipline,  able  to  analyze  in 
depth the formation of the ideas and doctrines in the 
same way as the structure of chemical combinations. 
It is worth quoting here a lengthy but extremely signi-
ficant excerpt:
“The total body of doctrine of any philosopher or  
school is almost always a complex and hetero-
geneous aggregate – and often in ways which the  
philosopher  himself  does not  suspect.  It  is  not  
only  a  compound  but  an  unstable  compound,  
though,  age  after  age,  each  new  philosopher  
usually forgets this melancholy truth. One of the  
results of the quest of unit- ideas in such a com-
pound is, I think, bound to be a livelier sense of  
the  fact  that  most  philosophic  systems are ori-
ginal or distinctive rather in their patterns than in  
their components. When the student reviews the  
vast sequence of arguments and opinions which  
fill our historical textbooks, he is likely to feel be-
wildered by the multiplicity and seeming diversity  
of the matters presented. Even if the array of ma-
terial  is simplified somewhat by the aid of con-
ventional  –  and  largely  misleading  –  classifica-
tions of philosophers by schools or -isms, it still  
appears extremely various and complicated; each 
age seems to evolve new species of reasonings  
and conclusions, even though upon the same old 
problems. But the truth is that number of essen-
tially  distinct  philosophical  ideas  or  dialectical  
motives is – as the number of really distinct jokes  
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is  said  to  be  –  decidedly  limited,  though,  no  
doubt, the primary ideas are considerably more  
numerous than the primary jokes”.17
Lovejoy presents as examples the ideas of God and 
Nature in the History of Philosophy, concepts which 
are able to be analyzed through a systematic break-
down of the doctrines in the philosophical traditions. 
With regard to Art History, it would be really useful to 
apply a similar analytical method for artistic periods. 
For instance, when we speak about “style” or “man-
ner” in regard to an artist or artistic epoch, we should 
place these terms in a wider  context,  attempting to 
understand in primis which meaning these two terms 
could have for the men of the period. We should con-
sider not only the impact on visual arts, but also on 
poetry,  literature  and  even  science.  Of  course  it 
doesn't imply that an art historian should have huge 
amounts  of  knowledge  in  many  different  areas.  It 
would only be desirable that he could be witty and 
adventurous  enough  to  search  in  distant  fields  for 
those „unit-ideas”,  as Lovejoy calls them, which are 
the cornerstones of cultural and artistic periods. To do 
this,  in  our  opinion,  the  art  historian  should  try  to 
identify himself, as much as possible, with the epoch 
at  the  center  of  his  studies.  He  should  not  forget, 
however,  that  he is  a man who belongs to another 
era, and therefore his personal education, beliefs, ta-
boos and idiosyncrasies, which sometimes cause an 
irreparable fracture between him and the object of his 
studies. In this case, the History of Ideas could be a 
very good help to the History of Art in understanding 
how much the ideas of the past look like or differ from 
the ideas of the time in which the art historian is living. 
The  philologist  Bruno  Snell  demonstrated  with  rare 
subtlety  and a  good interdisciplinary  approach  how 
the  idea  of  Man  and  a  human body in  the Ilias of 
Homer consists of a "federation" of limbs and motions 
with no idea of a higher unity, like a puppet made of 
articulated parts with no direct verbal unifying expres-
sion (there is no term in the whole homeric poems for 
"body")18. This lack of unity can be seen also in the 
Greek archaic painting (Abb. 2), as in the famous Di-
pylon Vases, in which men are represented like pup-
pets, whose parts seem easily separable.
These considerations lead us to think that our ways of 
observing and regarding the human being and his re-
lationships with the world around him, are completely 
different from those of the men of the Homeric Epoch. 
We will  probably never be able to understand them 
completely without looking syncretically at the various 
expressions of art and culture as testimony of a differ-
ent world view. Paul  Feyerabend,  who often quotes 
the essays of Snell, reaches a really interesting con-
clusion in the meaning of these cultural patterns:
“The argument (which can never be conclusive)  
consists  in pointing to characteristic  features in  
distant fields. If the idiosyncrasies of a particular  
style of painting are found also in statuary, in the  
grammar of  contemporary  languages (and here  
especially  in covert classifications which cannot  
be easily twisted around), if it can be shown that  
these languages are spoken by artists and by the  
common folk alike, if there are philosophical prin-
ciples formulated in the languages which declare  
the idiosyncrasies to be features of the world and  
not  just  artifacts  and  which  try  to  account  for  
their origin, if man and nature have these features  
not only in paintings, but also in poetry, in popu-
lar sayings, in common law, [...] then we may as-
sume that we are not just dealing with technical  
failures and particular  purposes,  but  with  a  co-
herent  way  of  life,  and  we  may  expect  that  
Abb.2: Sketch of a man painted on a Dypilon Vase.
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people involved in this way of life see the world in  
the same way in which we now see their pictures.  
It seems that all these conditions are satisfied in  
archaic  Greece:  the  formal  structure  and  the 
ideology of the Greek epic as reconstructed both  
from the text and from later references to it re-
peat  all  the  peculiarities  of  the  later  geometric  
and the early archaic style”.19
This  article  is  actually  valid  for  many other  cultural 
periods. For instance, it would be extremely interest-
ing to observe, with a History of Ideas approach, why 
in the art and literature of the 15th Century, especially 
in Nordic countries, it  is possible to find a constant 
tendency  (indeed  coming  from the  Middle  Ages)  to 
accentuate  every detail  and develop „every thought 
and image to the end, or give concrete form to every 
concept of the mind”20. This tendency to minutely de-
scribe the world is visible in the painting "Adoration of 
the  Mystic  Lamb",  created  by  Hubert  and Jan Van 
Eyck (Abb. 3), as much as a kind of Horror Vacui in 
the many examples of contemporary poetry, theology 
and even scientific text, reflecting a „coherent way of 
life” as Feyerabend calls it, very distant from ours.
This is to say: when we observe a work of art and use 
such terms as "space", "order", "proportions" or even 
"style", are we really aware that our ideas have radic-
ally changed from those men whose creations are the 
center  of  our  attention?  Are  we aware  that  we  are 
dealing with "epistemic structures",  which reflect an 
entire world view with countless links to other con-
temporary cultural products? When we are aware of 
that, we will also understand that our way to analyze a 
work of  art  or an artistic  period is strictly  personal, 
and that an absolutely valid method for the History of 
Art  is  not  really  possible.  Indeed,  the  encounter 
between an observer and a work of art has the same 
value as that between two distant  world views, and 
therefore  would  be  at  least  really  difficult  to  find  a 
generally  acceptable  sort  of  agreement  to  observe, 
describe and re-create the account of this encounter 
in a text. We have merely attempted here to suggest a 
more  open  approach  to  the  History  of  Art,  which 
takes into account how the ideas are distributed in the 
various fields of knowledge, and how the art historian 
has to sometimes become a kind of "dowser" in order 
to discover them. 
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Zusammenfassung
Zwei Fragen bilden den Ausgangspunkt: Ist es mög-
lich,  eine  allgemeine  und  'wirksame'  Methode  zur 
Kunstgeschichte zu finden? Welche sind die geistes-
wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen, die besonders heran-
gezogen werden können, um die Forschungsarbeit ei-
nes  Kunsthistorikers  zu  unterstützen  und  zu  berei-
chern? In diesem Beitrag wird eine kurze Analyse der 
Praxis der Kunstgeschichte vorangestellt – und 'ver-
sucht', indem  sowohl Berührungspunkte mit als auch 
Unterscheidungen  zu  anderen  wissenschaftlichen 
Forschungsmethoden  diskutiert  werden.  Kann  man 
etwa, da Kunstgeschichte normalerweise in Form von 
wörtlicher  „Erzählung“  erscheint,  wirklich  über  eine 
Übereinstimmung  zwischen  der  konkreten  Präsenz 
des  Kunstgegenstandes  in  der  Realität  und  seiner 
Existenz im Text sprechen? Im Beitrag wird auch der 
Vorschlag gemacht, die Kunstgeschichte konsequent 
in einem ideengeschichtlichen Kontext zu betrachten, 
vornehmlich in der Richtung, die Arthur Lovejoy in sei-
nem berühmten Essay The Great Chain of Being vor-
geschlagen  hat.  Im  Grunde  schlägt  die  Ideenge-
schichte  stets  eine  Brücke  zwischen  verschiedenen 
Disziplinen und kann immer neue Aspekte einer Epo-
che  beleuchten,  die  ansonsten  in  fachspezifischen 
Forschungen verbannt oder sogar vernachlässigt blei-
ben würden. Die Ideengeschichte sollte so idealerwei-
se die Kunstgeschichte immer begleiten und sie dabei 
unterstützen, etwa das Moment der „schöpferischen 
Intuition“, im Sinne von Henri Bergson, der Prägung 
einer  Theorie oder  einer  neuen Kunstepoche zu  er-
greifen, um darüber eine Art Osmose zwischen den 
Standpunkten von Gegenwart und Vergangenheit  zu 
fördern.
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